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Essay

~on

Hate and Equality

Alon Har er and Gideon Pa:rchomovskytt

B ia s crime legislation-or, as it is sometimes called , hate crime
legislation- enhances the punishment of crimes th at are carried out because
of the victim ' s race, gender, religion, or sexual orientation. Since its
inception, bias crime legislation has sparked substantial political
controversy and scholarly discussion . This debate was recently rekindled by
the horrendous murder of Matthew Shepard, which shocked our society and
prompted President Clinton to speak to the issue in this year' s State of the
Union Address. 1 The academic community, however, remains deeply
divided over the need for and desirability of such legislation.2
The disagreement about bias crime is due in large part to the fact that
existing justifications for bias crime legislation proceed from the premise
that the rationale supporting bias crime legislation must be found either in

t Se ni or Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Hebrew University ; Visiting Professor, Columbia Law
School ( 1998-1 999).
tt Associ ate Professor, Fordham Uni versity School of Law. Thi s essay benefited gre atl y fro m
comments by Dav id Alexande r, Avi Bell, Bri an Bi x, Russell Chti stopher, Sherry Colb , Mi chael
Dorf, George Fletcher, Assaf Hamdani, Doron Kalir, Peter Kougasian, Dan Richman, Steve
Shepard, Peter Siegelman , Kenneth Simons, Joseph Raz, and Ben Zipu rsky.
1. " Di scrimination or violence becau se of race or religion, ancestry or gende r, dis abili ty or
sexual orientatio n, is wrong, and it ought to be illegal. Therefore, I ask Congress to make the
'Employme nt Non- Discriminatio n Act' and the 'Hate Crimes Prevention Act' the law of the
land. " Address Before a Joint Sessio n of the Co ngress on the State of the Uni on, 35 W EE KLy
COM P. PRES. Do c. 78,87 (Jan . 19, 1999).
2. Compare Susan Gellm an, Sticks and Srones Can Put You in Jail, but Can Wo rds Increase
Yo ur Senrence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UC LA L.
REV . 333 , 358-79 ( 199 1) (arguing that penalty-enhanceme nt statutes violate the Firs t
Amendme nt), with Laurence H. Tribe, Th e Mystel)' of Motive. Private and Public: Some Not es
In spired by th e Problems of Hate Crim e and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SUP. CT. REv . I , 35 (" [T]he
motive underl ying-as opposed to the message expressed by--eithe r public o r private conduct
quite often is a legitimate fac tor to consider in deciding how our polity should treat th at
conduct. " ).

507

508

The Yale Law Journal

lVol. 109: 507

the greater gravity of the wrongdoing involved in such crimes or m the
perpetrator's greater degree of culpability .3 Advocates of bias crime
legislation strive to demonstrate that bias crimes are more wrongful than
identical crimes not motivated by bias, 4 or that bias crimes implicate a
greater degree of culpability on the part of the perpetrator of the crime.5
Equally committed to this premise, opponents of bias crime legislation
purport to show that bias crimes are not more wrongful than identical
crimes not motivated by hate and that they do not involve greater
cul pability on the part of the perpetrator. 6 Thus, the discussion of the
desirability and necessity of bias crime legislation has foc used almost
exclusively on the wrongfulness of the act and on the moral
blameworthiness of the perpetrator of the crime, assuming that these
constitute the only grounds upon which penalty enhancement for bias
crimes can be justified.
This premise is grounded in a more comprehensive theory that
dominates the non-utilitarian discourse of criminal law-that the
only two grounds that may justify disparate treatment of offenses
in the context of criminal law are the wrongfulness of the act or the
culpability of the perpetrator. 7 Despite its semblance of fairness, this
wrongfulness-culpability paradigm is heavily biased in favor of criminal
offenders. Because the criminal offender controls, to a large extent, both her
conduct and her mental state, the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm
confers upon the criminal offender the power to dictate the content of
criminal prohibitions and the sanctions imposed for violating them. The
wrongfulness-culpability paradigm assigns no independent importance to
the crime victim. Under this paradigm, the harm to the victim is merely one
factor out of many that may affect the wrongfulness of the act.

3. See, e.g., FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN
LAW 161-75 (1999) (arguing that bias crimes ought to be punished more severely than parallel
crimes because of the greater harm caused and the greater culpability of the criminal); Anthony
M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime
Statutes, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1015, 1019 (1997) ("[T]he penalties imposed by a criminal justice
system, at a minimum, must be deserved by those they are inflicted on and ... desert, in tum, is a
function of (1) the gravity of the wrongdoing involved and (2) the wrongdoer's degree of
culpability for that wrongdoing.").
4. See LAWRENCE, supra note 3, at 61 (arguing that bias c1imes are more wrongful than
otherwise motivated crimes because of their impact on the individual victim, her community, and
society at large).
5. See id. at 58-61 (discussing the centrality of the concept of culpability to criminal law and
arguing that perpetrators of bias crimes have greater culpability than those of parallel crimes).
6. See Dillof, supra note 3, at 1036-80 (rebutting the claims that hate crimes are more
wrongful and that the perpetrators of hate crimes are more culpable).
7. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY 103 (1990);
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW§§ 6.6 to 6.6.1, at 454-59 (1978); ROBERT
NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363-97 (1981); Michael S. Moore, The Independent
Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237, 237-38 (1994).
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Thi s Essay challenges thi s paradigm and proposes an alternati ve theory
in support of bias crime leg islation. The primary tlaw of the wrongfulnes sculpability paradigm is the exclusi ve role it assigns to factors that are
intrinsic to the criminal encounter in determining the content of the
prohibition s of criminal law and the severity of its sanctions. It neglects,
therefore, broad societal concerns that are extrinsic to the criminal
encounter, such as the relative vulnerabi lity of potential crime victims and
their likelihood of being attacked. Furthermore , it completely ignores
society's duty to provide equal protection from crime to different potenti al
victims. This limited prism allows the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm to
take into account the actual harm inflicted on crime victims , but it precludes
it from considering the rel ative vulnerability to crime of various victims in
determining criminal punishment. Hence, the wrongfulness-culpability
paradigm provides no basis fo r fa ir di stribution of protection against crime
to various potenti al victims.
The inability of the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm to give
sufficient weight to th e interests of victims calls into question its dominance
in criminal law theory. By challenging the exclusivity of the wrongfulnessculpability paradigm, this Essay challenges some of the conventional
normative foundations that underlie discourse about criminal law.
Specifically, this Essay argues that acknowledging the role of the victim is
essential in understanding bias crime legislation and its normative roots. To
accommodate broader societal concerns, the Essay develops an alternative
to the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm, which we call the "fair
protection paradigm." The fair protection paradigm is predicated on the
proposition that the criminal law is a principal means by which society
provides protection against crime to potential victims. On this view,
protection against crime is a good produced by the criminal justice system,
which, like many other state-produced goods, should be distributed in an
egalitarian manner. 8 Accordingly, the fair protection paradigm requires the
state to take into account disparities among individuals in vulnerability to
crime when determining their entitlement to protection. Thus, under the fair
protection paradigm, victims who are particularly vulnerable to crime may
have a legitimate claim on fairness grounds to greater protection against
crime. Bias crime legislation, on this view, is aimed at protecting
individuals who are particularly vulnerable to crime because of prevailing
prejudices against them.
An individual's vulnerability to crime can be defined as the expected
harm from crime for that individual-that is, the probability of harm
multiplied by its magnitude. Individuals may be particularly vulnerable to

8. See Alon Hare!, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law
Prin ciple of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1181 , 1200-08 (1994).
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crime fo:: two different reasons : a greater sensitivity to harm and a greater
likelihood of becoming a victim. Individual s 'vVho fall into the forrn er
category may be label ed "extra-sensitive victims ," and ind ivid uals who
belong to the latter may be called" high-risk victims ."
A state may address the problem of vulnerable victims in one of two
ways. First, it may impose harsher sanctions on those who commit crimes
against vulnerable victims. Second, it may devote more resources to
identifying and prosecuting individual s who attack such victims. While
both strategies are likely to discourage attacks on vulnerable victims and
thereby to provide them with greater protection , the latter strategy may
sometimes be infeasible or too costly. Therefore , equali zi ng protection
through the imposition of harsher sanctions may sometimes be the only way
by which the state can provide vulnerable victims with more protection and
consequently equalize their vulnerability to that of other potential victims.
Yet the principle of equalizing protection against crime should be
constrained in certain ways. The fair distribution of protection does not
require absolute equality of the expected costs of crime. Under a radical
interpretation , equal protection again st c1ime might be understood to
require the state to equalize the expected costs of crime for all potential
victims. This view of equality would imply a duty on the part of the state to
address any vulnerability to crime, regardless of its source or reason, and to
place all of its citizens on equal footing in terms of their exposure to c1ime.
But such a radically egalitarian view cannot provide a solid basis for
understanding the nature of criminal law; nor can it be morally justified.
Vulnerability to crime is a function of myriad factors such as wealth, age,
attitude toward risk, life experience, and physical and intellectual prowess.
Not all of these factors should be taken into account by the state. Some
disparities in the vulnerability to crime depend on the investment in
precautions by the victim herself. Other disparities may be grounded in luck
and other factors that do not mandate interference by the state. The state
cannot be reasonably expected to annul all of the disparities in the
vulnerability of different potential victims of crime.
The implausibility of the radical egalitarian view should not, however,
prod one to endorse the radically inegalitarian view, namely, the view that
the state should be blind to differences in vulnerability among victims. In
fact, the state's failure to redress some of the differences in the expected
costs of crime among different potential victims is intolerable and unjust.
This Essay argues, therefore, for an intermediate position, one which
requires the state to annul certain disparities in the vulnerability of different
victims while allowing other disparities to remain. More specifically, we
take the position that, at a minimum, a liberal state must redress disparities
in vulnerability to crime that result from certain immutable personal
characteristics of the victim.
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The duty of the state to ann ul differences in vulnerabili ty among
d l ~lere nt potential victirr1s does not depend on the !Tiagrj tude uf the
disparity in the vulnerabi lity of different victims, but rather on the reasons
underlying the greater vulnerab ility of some victims. Th us, even sli ght
differences in vulnerability att ributable to rac ial facto rs may justify
puni shment-enhanci ng legislati on, whiie greater differences attributable, for
instance, to the victim's choices requi re no action on the part of the state.
Tc be sure, opponents of bias crime legislation may criticize our
analysi s on the ground that di stributive justice theories, like the one we
proffer, are alien to criminal law . But such ctiticism would be misguided. In
fact, the" fair protection paradigm" provides a theoretical basis for rr..any of
the doctrines of criminal law, and its expl anatory power ranges beyond the
context of bias crimes. The fa ir protection paradigm can expl ain, for
instance, why crimes directed against extra-sensiti ve victims are often
punished more severely than crimes directed agai nst less vulnerable ones .
Properly understood, therefore, bias crime legislati on is part of a larger
scheme of providing fair protecti on against crime. Recognizing the interest
of victims makes it clear that bias crime legislation is consonant with the
goals of criminal law. Bias crime legislatio n is merel y one essential step
toward a more egalitarian provision of protection against crime-a step that
coheres with the broader goals of the criminal law system .
This Essay consists of three Parts. Part I explores traditional
justifications for bias crime legislation-in particular, those that rest on the
wrongfulness-culpability paradigm . It demonstrates that the wrongfulnessculpability paradigm fails to provide an adequate justification for biascrime legislation. Part II develops the fair protection paradigm. It illustrates
that the principle of fair protection is not merely normatively compelling,
but also provides a powerful justification for otherwise inexplicable
sentencing practices. Part III applies the fair protection paradigm to biascrime legislation and demonstrates that the fair protection paradigm can
explain the contemporary logic underlying bias crime legislation.
I. TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR BIAS CRIME LEGISLATION:
THE WRONGFULNESS-CULPABILITY FRAMEWORK

As a mle, criminal law disregards motives. Criminal law regulates
conduct by punishing socially undesirable behavior. The severity of the
punishment is calibrated to the undesirability of the behavior; motives are
largely irrelevant. 9 Bias crime laws constitute an important exception to the
9. See WAYNE R. L AFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, J R. , CRIMINAL LAW § 3.6, at 227 (2d ed.
1986) (" [M]otive, if narrow ly defined to exclude recognized defenses and the 'specific intent'
requirements of so me crimes, is not relevant on the substantive side of the criminal law." ); Martin
R. ·Gardner, The Men s Rea Enigma: Obse1vations on the Role of .i\l!orive in the Crimina l Law Past
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general rule. The motive of the perpetrator is the foca l point of bias crime
Jaws . Unlike mher crimina l legi slation , bias crimes enhance the punishment
of ordinary crimes that have been motivated by a racial, ethnic , sexuaL or
religious prejudice. The departure of bias crime laws from the general
scheme of criminal law calls for justification. After all , it is not se lf-evident
that an assault motivated by prejudice is worse than an assault otherwise
motivated. Yet, the form er, being a bias crime, may be punished two or
three times more severely . 10
Various rationales have been proffered to justify bias crime laws. The
most frequentl y in voked rationales for bias crime laws focu s either on the
cu lpability of bias crime offenders or on the wrongfulness of the act as
reflected in its im pact on the victim and third parties. 11 While these
rationales are not based on a single theory or principle, they share the
premise that the distinctiveness of bias crimes inheres in the very nature of
the acts-be it their moral culpability or their impact.
This Part presents the arguments in favor of bias crime legislation in
greater detail , examines them critically, and explains why they fail to
provide an adequate theoretical foundation for bias crime legislation.
Section A explores the claim that perpetrators of bias crimes are more
culpable than perpetrators of similar crimes who are not motivated by
hatred. Section B evaluates the claim that bias crimes are more wrongful
than other crimes, either because they impose greater harms on their victims
or because of the special harms that they impose on third parties. Section C
critically examines the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm's traditional
justification for bias crime legislation.
A. The Greater Culpability Justification

Culpability has always been a key element in our system of criminal
law. In determining punishment, criminal law often does not confine itself
to conduct; it considers moral blameworthiness as well. 12 Identical unlawful
and Present, 1993 UTAH L REV. 635 (contending that motives do not and should not play a role
at the level of offense definition in criminal law and that they are only relevant for asserting
defenses).
10. See l AMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTIER, HATE CRIMES 147 (1998). But see D.C.
CODE . ANN. § 22-4003 (1981 & Supp. 1999) (authorizing the court to sentence a bias crime
offender to no more than one and one-half times the maximum imprisonment and fine allowed by
the underlying offense).
1 L See Dillof, supra note 3, at 1019.
12. American criminal law is based on the principle of blameworthiness or culpability.
Section 2.02 of the Model Penal Code provides general rules of criminal liability by creati ng four
mental states that represent four degrees of culpability: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)-(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Its drafter
explained that "on ly four concepts are needed to prescribe the minimal requirements and Jay the
basis for distinctions that may use fully be drawn." Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal
Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L REV. 1425, 1436 (1968). Thi s
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acts may carry radically divergent punishments due to the culpability of
their perpetrators . For example, the punishme nts of homicide offenders
vary dramatically depending upon whether they acted negligently,
rec kless ly, know in gly, or intentionally. Consequently , proponents of bias
crime laws argue that offenders who act out of hate or prejudice are more
blameworthy than otherwise motivated offenders and therefore deserve
more severe punishment. 13 On this view, crimes motivated by prejud ice are,
by their very nature , morall y worse than similar crimes not motivated by
prej udice, and the punishment for such crimes must retlect their heinous
nature.
The weak ness of th is justifi cati on is that it depends on the prem ise that
prejudice is more morally reprehensible than all other crimin al motives. But
this pre mise does not with stand scrutiny. Unlike mens rea, motives cannot
be readily ranked by their degree of culpability. While no one disputes that
a defendant who inte ntionally killed a person is more blameworthy than a
defendant who negli ge ntly brought about the same res ul t, and should
the refore be punished more severely , many would question the proposition
that an offender moti vated by prejudice is more cu lpable than one
motivated by greed, spite, or pure sadism. 14 Indeed, it is not at all clear that
a racially moti vated as sault is more morally reprehensible than an assault
on an elderly person in order to steal her subsi stence allowance. The reason
why people have differing views regarding the culpability of various
criminal motives is that, at some level, motives appear to be
incommensurable. As Jeffrie Murphy suggests, "[P]erhaps almost all
assaults, whether racially motivated or not, involve motives of humiliation
and are thus evil to the same degree." 15 At the end of the day , the project of
correlating motives to moral culpability seems hopelessly unfruitful, and,
consequently, so is the attempt to justify bias crime legi slation on the
ground that bias-motivated offenses are morally worse than all other
offenses . 16

articulatio n of the mens rea requireme nt is its most important achievement. See Pa ul H. Robinson,
A Brief HistOI)' of Distinctions in Crim inal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J . 815, 815-21 ( 1980)
(desc ribin g the distinctions amon g the Code's c ulpability te rms and their importance). Moreover,
section 2.02 may be co nsid ered represen tative of the modem American culpability scheme, as it
exerted a majo r influence on criminal law reform in 36 of the 38 jurisdictions where reform has
occ uned since its fmmulation. See Pau l H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in
Defining Criminal Liability: Th e lv!odel Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REv. 68 1, 691-92
( 1983).
13. See, e.g., Lawrence Crocker, Hate Crime Statutes: Just ? Constitutional? Wise?, 19921993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 485,491-94.
14. See, e.g., JACO BS & POTTER, supra note 10, at 80.
15. Jeffri e G. Murphy , Bias Crimes: What Do Hate rs Desen1e ?, 11 CRIM. J UST. ETHICS 23
(1992) .
16. For more general argu ments against cu lpability theory, see Dillof, supra note 3, at 106380.
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B . Th e Greoter Wrong Justificotion
I.

Greoter Wrong to th e Victim

One of the more influential arguments for bias crime legislation is that
bias crimes are more harmful to the victim. Citing thi s principl e, proponents
of bias crime laws have asserted that bias crimes con sistently inflict a more
severe harm on the victim and thu s are more wron gful than otherwise
similar crimes . 17 There are three types of arguments that fall into this
category: the greater phy sical harm, the greater mental harm, and the
discriminatory treatment.
It is often argued that bias crimes tend to be excessively brutaL 1 ~
Despite its popularity, the "excess ive brutality" justif ication suffers from
two major tlaws that cast serious doubt on its validity . First, it lacks
empirical support. The only empirical finding Jack Levin and Jack
McDevitt use to support their claim that bias crimes are excessively brutal
is that, relative to other crimes, they are more likely to result in some
phy sical injury to the victim. 19 This, however, does not suggest that bias
crimes are inherently more brutal than other comparable crimes. All it
proves is that, relative to other crimes, a disproportionately large number of
bias crimes consist of assaults. It provides no basis for inferring that the
brutality of bias-motivated assaults exceeds that of assaults not motivated
by hatred.
Second, the "excessive brutality" justification does not explain the
need to enhance the sanction for bias crimes as opposed to the need to
enhance the sanction for brutal crimes. Even if bias crimes are indeed more
brutal, standard criminal law can take that into account by punishing brutal
offenders more severely, irrespective of their motives. The availability of a
wide range of punishments for each category of offenses gives judges the
power to mete out greater punishments to brutal crime offenders. Brutality
is a factor easily established evidentiarily, certainly more easily than
motive . Thus, the alleged tendency of bias crimes to be excessively brutal
does not provide an adequate justification for the enactment of bias crime
laws.

17. See, e.g., LAWRENCE, supra note 3, at 39 ("[Bias] crimes are far more likely to be violent
than are other crimes.").
18. For a study supporting this view, see JACK LEVIN & JACK MCDEVITT, HATE CRIMES:
THE RISING TIDE OF BIGOTRY AND BLOODSHED 11 (1993). This conviction is disputed in a recent
book on hate crimes . See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 10, at 81-82 (citing LEVIN & MCDEVITT,
supra , at 11 ); see also Joan C. Weiss, Ethnoviolence: Impact Upon and Response of Victims and
the Community, in BIAS CRIME: AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LEGAL RESPONSES 176
(Robert J. Kelly ed. , 1993) (discu ssing the impact of bias crimes).
19. See LEVIN & McDEVITT, supra note 18, at 11. This finding is based on a study of the
records of the Boston police from the years 1983 to 1987.
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A so me v.;hat related jw;tific ati o n that focuses o n the impact of bias
crimes on victim s emphasizes the psycho log ic al inj ury suffered by bias
crime vic tim s . This rati o nale originate d in the celebrated case of Wisconsin
v. Mitchel/,20 in whi c h the S upreme Co urt stated that bias crim es are " more
li ke ly to ... int1ict di stinct e moti onal harms o n the ir victims." 2 1 Although
the S upreme C ourt cited no evide nce, this state ment won immediate fa vor
with variou s sch olars in th e fi el d. who scurri ed to provide the mi ssing
empirical data . Elaborati ng o n the S upreme Court 's state ment, Steven
Be nnett We isburd and Brian Lev in wrote th at "[b]ecau se the violence
[in volved in b ias crim es] is so bru ta l, the degradatio n so complete and the
vul nerability so omnipre se nt, bias cri me VICtim s exhibit greater
psychological trauma th an non- bias victim s." 22 Weisburd and Le vin
developed their th eory ba ~: ed on two studies of bias crime victims
co nducted by the N ati o na l In sti tute Again st Prejudice and Vio lence
(NIAPV) in 1986 and 1989 . T hese studies repo rted the harsh psychological
and emotio nal effects bias cri me had on victims, but fa iled to compare them
to those experienced by victims of other crimes. Thi s comparison was not
m ade until 1994 when Arnold B arnes and Paul Ephross conducted a
comparati ve study th at surveyed the psychological and e moti onal injuries
of all crime victims . They fo und that th e psychological and emo ti o nal
injuries suffered by bias crime vi ctims were virtu ally identical to those
suffered by other victims, w ith one minor difference : Bias crime victim s did
no t suffer f rom low self-estee m . 23
Finally , some scholars maintain that the primary harm of bias crimes
inheres in the di scriminatory treatment of the victim . On this vie w , the
victim of bias crime is harmed beyond the general ri ght not to be physically
injured because she is treated discriminatorily. That is, she is not merely
subj ected to violence, but subj ected to violence because of her race, sexual

orientation, or other characteristic. 24
Yet, as Anthony Dill of shows, this discriminatory treatment does not
exacerbate the wrong committed by the perpetrator of the crime. Under
Dill of's view, in order to es tablish a protectable interest, a person must
show that a matter she is concerned with is properly her concern rather than

20. 508 U.S. 476 (1 993) .
21. !d. at 488.
22. Steve n Bennett Weisburd & Brian Levin, "On the Basis of Sex ": Recognizing GenderBased Bias Crimes, 5 STAN. L. & POL 'Y REV. 2 1, 25 (1 994).
23. See Arnold Barnes & Paul H. Ephross, The Impact of Hate Violence on Victims:
Emo Tional and Behavioral Responses to Attacks, 39 Soc. WORK 247, 250 ( 1994). Jacobs and
Potter note, however, th at certain " low-leve l" expressive offenses, such as the drawing of
offe nsive graffiti and vand alism, may be carried out only against certain reli gious, ethnic , and
othe rwise marginalized groups. and thus in this contex t " greater harm arguments" may have
so me merit. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 10, at 84-85.
24. For a good di sc ussion an d reb uttal of this type of argument, see Dillof, supra note 3, at

1036-49.
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someone else's. Recognizing the disCiiminatory treatment as an additional
wrong di sassociated from the wrong of the vio lent crime it seif is an
acknowledgme nt that the victim has a protectable interest in the
perpetrator's thoughts. 25 While members of minorities are often justifiably
concerned about other people's thoughts, their concerns do not amount to
protectable interests and should not be regarded as such. 26
2.

Th e Impact of Bias Crime on Third Parties

Another justification for bias crime legislation focuses on the external
effects of these crimes on third parties, both within and outside the victim' s
com munity. According to this justification, bias crimes have a unique
impact on the broader community, an impact which warrants the harsher
punishments meted out to bias crime offenders. Kent Greenawalt, for
example, points out that bias crimes "can frighten and humiliate other
members of the community" and "reinforce social divisions and hatred." 27
Echoing this view, James Weinstein remarks that hate-driven violence "can
inflict damage above and beyond the physical injury caused by a
garden-variety assault, both to the immediate victim and to other members
of the group to which the victim belongs ." 28
While bias crime invariably affects individu als removed from the
immediate victim, it is not unique in this sense. As Jacobs and Potter
observe, "Many crimes , whatever their motivation, have repercussions
beyond the immediate victim and his or her family and friends ." 29 Jacobs
and Potter list child abduction and murder as typical examples of crimes
that strike fear in the hearts and minds of entire communities and often have
a nationwide impact. 30 In fact, the list could be extended to include all
violent crime. Public opinion polls reveal that Americans perceive crime as
one of the nation's top problems. 31 Others have proposed that the two most
important factors that determine the impact of criminal activity may be
visibility and proximity. 32 For example, the highly visible near-murder of a
Central Park jogger in 1996 inspired terror in a very large number of New
25. See id. at 1039-40.
26. See id. at 1043-45.
27. Kent Greenawalt, Reflections on Justifications for Defining Crimes by the Ca tegory of
Victim, 1992-1993 ANN . SURV. AM. L. 617,627.
28. James Weinstein, First Amendment Challenges to Hate Crime Legislation: Where 's the
Speech?, 11 CR!M. JUST. ETHICS 6, 10 (1992) .
29. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 10, at 87.
30. See id.
31. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS , U.S. DEP' T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1994, at 140 tbl.2.1 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds.,
1995).
32. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et a!., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in
JUDGM ENT UNDER CERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463 (Daniel Kahneman et a!. eds. ,
1982).
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Yorkers and drove many of them away from the p:1rk. 33 Likewise, random
street violence and gang-related crimes have a profoundly negative effect
on inner-city dwellers, who are frequently ex posed to these forms of
criminal activity.'~ It is fair to conclude from the existing data that third
parties tend to be affected more by the brutality and frequ e ncy of crimes
than by the motives of the offender.
A variant of the previous ju stification, also centering on the third-party
effects of bias crimes, defends punishing bias crimes more severely on the
ground that such crimes may trigger retaliation and spark further violence.
In essence, this view maintains that criminal sanctions mu st take into
account not only the actual harm caused by the offe nder but also the
potential for future harms that are causally linked to her act. Whatever merit
this utilitarian justification may have as a general theory of punishment, it
suffers from three serious flaws as an explanation for bias crime legislation .
First, bias crime legislation encompasses many offenses that do not give
rise to the risk of retaliation. As Jacobs and Potter point out, "Retaliation
arises mostly in the context of race and ethnic conflicts and rarely in the
context of gay-bashing, anti-Semitic incidents, anti-Asian violence, and
violence against women ." 35 Yet all bias crimes are equally punishable
under the law. Second, bias crimes are by no means the only offenses that
carry potential for retaliation. Inter-gang violence and conflicts between
organized crime groups also present a greater risk of retaliation. But such
incidents of violence are dealt with by generic criminal law. Finally , and
perhaps most importantly, the "possible retaliation" justification is at odds
with longstanding principles of sentencing and fundamental notions of
fairness . Imposing more severe punishments on offenders whose conduct
sparked, or might have sparked, further violence would motivate offenders
to direct their attacks at the weakest and most marginalized groups in the
hope that such groups would be unable or unwilling to retaliate.
Correspondingly, it would induce otherwise peace-seeking communities to
resort to violence in order to deter bias crime offenders from preying on
their members. Thus, the net effect of correlating punishment to actual or
potential retaliation would be to render the communities most vulnerable to
bias crime even more vulnerable, and to ttigger retaliatory violence on the
part of bias crime victims.
In the final tally , none of the existing justifications provides a solid
basis for bias crime laws. The leading theories rely on dubious factual
assumptions that have been discredited by various empirical studies. The
failure of existing theorizing to justify bias crime laws has rendered the

33. See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 10, at 87.
34. See id.
35. !d. at 88 .
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laws a con stant target for critici sm and has spurred calls for their re pcal. ·' 6
Thi s failure retlects, in our view, the inherent limits of the wrongfulnessculpability framework.
A brief restatement of the reasons for the failure of the wrongfulnessculpability paradigm to justify bias crime legi slation: The wrongfulnessculpability paradigm supports differe ntial sanctions for perpetrators of
crime only so long as the behavior of one perpetrator is shown to be e ither
more wrongful or more culpable than that of the others. Thus, unde r thi s
paradigm, the enhancement of sanctions for bias crimes requires a showing
that bias crimes are either more wrongful or more culpable than ide ntical
crimes not motivated by bias.37 For the reasons elaborated above , neither of
these claims can be substantiated. The next Section examines and
challenges the dominance of the wrongfulness-culpability fram e work as a
unifying theory of criminal law and develops an alternative theory that
explains many essential features of criminal law: the fair protecti on
paradigm.

C. Th e Limits of the Wrongfuln ess-Culpability Framework
Traditionally, the primary concern of criminal law scholars has been to
ensure fair treatment to criminal offenders. Under the prevailing view,
fairness to criminal offenders demands proportionality between the
seriousness of the crime and the severity of the penalty. 38 The seriousness
of the crime is determined by two factors: the wrongfulness of the act (that
is, the moral quality of the act itself) and the culpability or accountability of
the perpetrator. The wrongfulness element denotes the moral quality of the
act, and the culpability element denotes the degree of moral responsibility
of the perpetrator of the act. 39 Adherents to this view believe that
wrongfulness and culpability are the only two legitimate factors that courts
should consider in meting out punishment to criminal offenders or, as one
champion of this view stated, "[t]o ask what punishment someone deserves
is to ask how much wrong they did, and with what culpability they did that
wrong." 40 Under this view, no factor should influence sentencing unless it
can be shown to influence either the wrongfulness of the act or the
culpability of the act' s perpetrator. 41

36. For a po werful attack on bias crime legi slation , see id. at 145-53.
37. See Dillof, supra note 3, at I 019 (" [A]ll justifi cations for the increased penalties imposed
by bias crime statutes can be analy zed as taking bias to be relevant to either gravity of wrongdoing
or degree of culpability ." ).
38. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: TH E CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 90 ( 1976).
39. For an anal ys is of these concepts , see FLETCH ER, supra note 7, § 6.6, at 454-91.
40. Moore, supra note 7, at 237.
41. Wron g fulne ss and culpability may be used in two different ways: in a foundati o nal
manner and in a de1iv ative mann e r. A utilitari an can also use terms such as wro ngfulness o r
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The wrongfulness-culpability paradigm consists of three distinct
claims. First, it consists of a negative claim: that in determining the criminal
sanction one should exclude all factors that do not bear upon the
wrongfulness of the act or the culpability of the perpetrator. 4 c The
considerations excluded by this principle are often grounded in impo11ant
values, which the state has a legitimate interest in promoting; yet, under the
wrongfulness-culpability paradigm, it is illegitimate to take these
considerations into account in determining criminal sanctions. Second, the
wrongfulness-culpability paradigm consists of a positive claim: that the
decisionmaker must take into account all the considerations that bear upon
the wrongfulness of the act or the culpability of the perpetrator.-\ 3 Third, the
wrongfulness-culpability paradigm employs a set of rules to assign weight
to each of the relevant factors and calibrates the criminal sanction to retlect
the cumulative weight of these considerations.4-l
The wrongfulness-culpability paradigm is not a complete theory of
sentencing; instead, it can be best characterized as a framework for
determining the appropriate sentence. Its ciassification as a framework is
based on the fact that it provides no guidelines as to which factors
determine the wrongfulness of an act or the culpability of the perpetrator.
Hence, the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm needs to be supplemented by
independent theories of wrongfulness and culpability.
The primary appeal of the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm is the fact
that it rests on the moral intuition that only aspects intrinsic to the crime
itself should determine the magnitude and severity of criminal punishment.
Taking other considerations into account violates the Kantian principle that
the criminal perpetrator must not be used as a means to promote societal
ends. This appeal is magnified by the fact that the wrongfulness-culpability
culpability to mediate between utility and legal responsibility. A person who endorses this
utilitarian view could even argue that wrongfulness and culpability are the only considerations
that should determine the criminal sanction. But by making this claim, the utilitarian does not join
the wrongfulness-culpability camp, because the meanings of the concepts "wrongfulness" and
"culpability" are derivative. For the purpose of this Essay, the wrongfulness-culpability
framework expresses a theory about the foundational values underlying sentencing.
42. In the classification developed by Joseph Raz, the negative claim is an exclusionary
reason~a reason that requires that the decisionmaker not act on the basis of considerations that do
not bear on the wrongfulness of the act or the culpability of the perpetrator. For a discussion of
exclusionary reasons, see JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 35-39 (1975).
43. There are, however, disputes as to the positive claim. Everybody seems to agree that
culpability is necessary to justify the imposition of a criminal sanction. Most scholars also argue
that wrongfulness is also a necessary condition for inflicting a criminal sanction. See, e.g.,
FLETCHER, supra note 7, § 6.6.3, at 466-69; George P. Fletcher, What Is Punishment Imposed
for?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 101 (1994). Others believe that wrongfulness is not a
necessary condition, although it can influence how much punishment is deserved. See, e.g.,
Moore, supra note 7, at 238. The most extreme view is held by Douglas Husak, who believes that
criminal liability does not require wrongdoing. See Douglas Husak, Does Criminal Liability
Require an Act?, in PHfLOSOPHY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 60 (Anthony Duff ed., 1998).
44. For an articulation of such a theory, see FLETCHER, supra note 7, §§ 6.6 to 6.7, at 454504.
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paradigm is capable of accommodating different theories of punishment
with radically different understandings of the concepts of culpability and
wrongfulness. 45 Most importantly , its dual character seems to facilitate a
dual concern for both the perpetrator of the crime (via its emphasis on
culpability) and the victim (via its emphasis on wrongfulness). The
culpability element focu ses primarily on the moral responsibility of th e
perpetrator of the crime and thus facilitates exoneration of the "innocent"
(i nculpable) perpetrators of wrongs.~ 6 The wrongfulness element concern s
itse lf with the moral quality of the criminal conduct; in assessing the moral
quality of different criminal acts, the wrongfulness element enables one to
take into account the actual harm inflicted on the victim and society as a
whole. 47 Thus, the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm seems to provide a
comprehensive framework for sentencing, a framework flexible enough to
accommodate the concerns of both victims and perpetrators of crime, and to
ensure fairness to both.
Naturally, the wrongfulness-culpability framework is not infinitely
flexible. It cannot accommodate utilitarian theories of punishment, for
instance. The utilitarian conviction that sentencing should maximize utility
cannot plausibly be articulated in terms of wrongfulness or culpability .~ 8
But given its ability to accommodate both the concerns of crime
perpetrators and of victims, the wrongfulness-culpability framework seems

45. Examining the diversity of theories that fall into this framework illustrates the flexibilit y
of the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm. Subjectivist theories interpret wrongdoing by focusing
on the actor's attitude toward the wrongdoing. The view that wrongfulness is grounded in the act
itself rather than in its external results fits this paradigm. See id. § 6.6.5, at 475. Objectivist
theories , in contrast, evaluate the wrongdoin g in objective term s. The view that wrongfulness is
grounded in results fits this position. See id. The debate, therefore, between objectivists and
subjectivists is a debate within the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm-a debate about the nature
of wrongfulness, not about the validity of the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm itself.
46. See id. § 6.6, at 455 (" [N]o one may be properly puni shed for a wrongful act (an act of
wrongdoing) unless the act is attributable to him.") .
47. The wrongfulness of an act has been interpreted differently by different theorists. Some
regard wrongfulness in wholly objective terms, while others believe that the wrongfulness of an
act must be assessed by examining the beliefs of the perpetrator of the act. For a classification of
the different theories of wrongfulness, see id. § 6.6.5, at 474-76. The great advantage of the
objective theories of wrongfulness is their ability to accommodate the concern for the victims of
crime. Arthur Ripstein has recently developed this argument. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY,
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 141 (1999) ("Punishment is scaled to the seriousness of th e
wrong rather than the expected advantage of the c1ime because it treats the denial of the victim's
rights as the measure of the wrongdoer's gain.").
48. Thus, Benn and Peters, in developing a utilitarian theory of punishment, argue:
The retributivist's difficulty is that he wants the crime itself to indicate the amount of
punishment, which it cannot do unless we first assume a scale of crimes and penalties.
But on what principles is the scale to be constructed, and how are new offences to be
fitted into it? These difficulties admit of no solution unl ess we agree to examine the
consequences to be expected from penalties of differe nt degrees of severity; i.e. unless
we adopt a utilitarian approach.
S.l. BENN & R.S. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 219 (1965).
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to constitute a comprehensive theory of punishment rhat can accommodate
all fairness-based concerns.
Yet a closer examination reveals that the wrongfulness-culpability
paradigm cannot accommodate all faime:;s-based concerns. Undoubtedly,
the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm can acc;__>rnmodate concerns of
fairness toward the perpetrator of a crime. The culpability element ensures
fairness to the perpetrator of a crime by eying her sanction to her
responsibility. Furthermore, through the \Vrongfulness element, which
considers the actual harm to the victim, the \Nrongfulness-culpability
paradigm accommodates, to some extent, the concerns of crime victims.
But the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm cannot accommodate
victim-related fairness concerns that are not directly associated with the
criminal act. Specifically, it cannot accommodate a concern for fair
distribution of protection against crime among potential victims. The
societal distribution of protection among potential victims is not, under the
wrongfulness-culpability paradigm, a relevant consideration in determining
the sentence. The concern for fair distribution of protection is related
neither to the wrongfulness of any particular act nor to the culpability of
any particular offender. Under the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm, an
offender is responsible for the wrong she committed if the wrong can
justifiably be attributed to her. But no particular offender is responsible for
the fact that the victim was particularly susceptible to crime due to the
disposition of other criminals to prey on her.
The case of high-risk victims poses a problem for the wrongfulnessculpability paradigm since it resides beyond the purview of the
wrongfulness-culpability inquiry. To appreciate the problem of high-risk
victims, one has to look beyond the specific relations between the
perpetrator of crime and the victim, and to examine instead the interrelations among victims as a group in light of their relative status in society.
But since the inquiry under the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm does not
cover such factors, it canriot address the problem of high-risk victims.
One can challenge this claim by arguing that a high-ri sk victim is more
vulnerable and, consequently, that a crime directed toward such an
individual is more wrongful than a crime against a less vulnerable
individual. Committing a crime against a person who is more likely to be a
victim (and therefore in greater need of protection) is more wrongful than
committing a crime against a person who is less likely to be a victim (and
therefore less in need of protection).
We believe that this argument fails because it does not take seriously
the distinction between extra-sensitive victims and high-risk victims. A
person who is a high-risk victim does not suffer a special harm if a crime is
committed against her. Committing a crime against a high-risk individual
does not impose a greater physical or mental harm on her, nor does it
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dimini sh her overa ll well-bei ng more th an it wo uld for a person w ho is a
low-ri sk vic tim. It seems arbitrary, there fore, to insi st th at it is more
wro ng: fu l to commi t a crime against a hi gh-risk victim th an it is to commit a
crime against a low-risk v i ct im.~'!
The motivation to incorporate fair protection consideration s into the
concept of wro ngfulness is not d iffi cult to detect. This motivation is based
on the beli ef that fair protection considerations can be part of crim inal law
only if it is sho wn that they can be integrated into our understanding of the
concept of wron gfuln ess . Under thi s view, if acts A and B are equally
wrongful and are committed by equally culpable persons, there could be no
reason to punish the perpetrator of A more than the perpetrator of B. Hence,
without fin ding some way of incorporating fair protection concern s into the
very concept of wrongfulness, such concerns cannot be integrated at all into
the syste m of criminal law.
It is not difficult to find examples that run counter to this v ie w.
Ha rming my child is not more wrongful than harmin g someone else's child.
Yet I may have weightier reasons to protect my child than to protect
someone else's child. It is possible, therefore , that an agent, such as a
parent, may have a stronger obligation to prevent wrongful acts committed
against X, her son, than wrongful acts committed against Y, so meo ne else' s
child. Another example that is more relevant to our context is the greater
obligation of the state to prevent wrongs committed against its citi ze ns than
to prevent identical wrongs committed against noncitizens.
An advocate of the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm may concede
this point but argue that despite this conceptual possibility , it is indeed more
wrongful to commit a crime against a high-risk victim. But such an
expansive understanding of the concept of wrongfulness undermines the
theory. In particular, it is imperative for such a theory to demonstrate the
greater wrongfulness of a crime directed at a high-risk victim without
relying in any way on the premise that the state has a greater obligation
toward these victims.
We do not deny the possibility that, in principle, one could develop a
theory of wrongfulness that would incorporate fair protection concerns. Yet
incorporating fair protection into the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm
would radically transform the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm. It would
requ ire an expansion of the concept of wrongfulness far beyond its
traditional boundaries. If our arguments motivate the advocates of the
~

~

~

49. Naturally , being a high-1isk victim may be corre lated with greate r fear on the part of the
victim and excessive precautions that dismpt her life. An actual crime committed ag ainst a highri sk victim may cause her greater harm due to her ac ute awareness of her special vuln e rab ility.
Committing a Clime ag ainst a hi gh-risk victim of this type is indeed particul arl y wrongful. This
co nclusion, however, is due not to the fact that the victim is at high ri sk. but to other fac tors that
may be ca us ally rel ated to her vulnerability, such as he r fe ar and the disruption of he r life.
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wrongfu ln ess-culpability
paradigm
to
integrate
fair
protection
considerat ions into the conce pt of wrongfulness , thi s result merely
demonstrates the compelling normative force of fair protection, cunentl y
neg lec ted by criminal law theori sts.
In sum , fair protection considerations cannot be readily incorporated
into the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm. fmport ing them into the
concept of wrongfulness would stretch the noti o n of wrongfulness we ll
beyo nd its co nve ntional meaning.
But should the greater vulnerability of victims affec t sentencing
practices? Do high-ri sk victim s really have a right to greater protection?
And if they do, can thi s right justify the impositi on of differenti a l sanctions
accord ing to the vulnerability of the victims? The next Part illustrates that
such a right actually exists and that, consequently , one of the primary
defi c ie ncies of the wrongfulness-culpability parad igm is its failure to
address the special concerns of vulnerable victims .
[]. CRIMINAL LAW AND THE FAIR PROTECTION P ARADIGM

T he fair protection paradigm is premised on the insight that one of the
primary aims of CJiminal law should be to di stribute protection in an
egalitarian manner. Consequently, it maintain s th at criminal sanction s
should be crafted in accordance with this goal.
The principle of equality enjoys pride of place in moral and political
philosophy. Yet there is a wide di sagreement among philosophers about the
role of equality as an independent value and the ramifications it has for
shaping political and social institutions. Some contemporary moral
philosophers believe that equality is a fundamental principle of a just
society and that disagreements about the nature of justice are essentially
di sagreements about the concept of equality. Dworkin regards equality as a
fo undational value, 50 and hi s position has been very influential among
political theorists. Likewise, R awls's theory of justice regards equality as a
fundamental value. 51
Other philosophers, however, reject this view. Most notably, Raz
believes that equality is not an independent value at all and that while
enhancing equality can promote justice in various legal contexts, it can do
so not because inequality is evil but because the pursuit of equality helps
satisfy the greater needs of people who are worse off_5 2 Thus, even those

See RON ALD DWORKI N, What Rights Do We Ha ve ?, in T AKJ NG RIGH TS SERIOUSLY 266
Ronald Dworkin , In Defense of Equa lity, I Soc. PHIL. & POL. 24 (1983) .
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 504-12 ( 1972).
See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MOR ALITY OF FREEDOM 2 17-44 (1986); see also Harry Frankfurt,
Equality as a Moral Ideal, 98 ETHICS 2 1 ( 1987), reprinted in H AR RY FRANKFURT, THE
IM PORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 134, 149 (1988) ("The fu ndamental error of

50.
( 1977);
5 1.
52.
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who ascribe no independent value to equality do not advocate a political
system indifferent to disparities in wealth or other goods. Instead, they
maintain that the reduction of wealth or other disparities is merely a
byproduct of the state's fulfilling its obligations to its citizens.
A simple example may help elucidate this view. If A is on the verge of
starvation while B is onl y mildly hungry, the greater and more urgent need
of A, rather than a desire to promote equality between A and B, provides a
reason to help A before helping B. The greater need of A generates a strong
reason to give the bread to A. The lesser need of B generates a weak reason
to provide B with the bread. Consequently, the reason to provide A with the
bread oven-ides the reason to provide B with the bread, and a person who
acts in accordance wit h reason is required to provide A with the bread.
Satisfying more urgent individual needs would often resulr in a more
egalitarian distribution of resources , but it is the needs of each individual
that determine what she deserves-not the duty to minimize disparity
among different individuals.
This Essay is neutral with respect to this central philosophical debate
concerning equality. While our analysis is phrased in terms of equality of
protection, it does not presuppose that equality of protection is a
foundational value. The fair protection paradigm can be grounded in the
value of providing equality of protection against crime to victims. But it
could also be interpreted as granting priority to the greater need for
protection of vulnerable victims. This enables us to remain neutral as to
whether the primary justification for such a policy is grounded m the
aspiration to eliminate the inherent evils of inequality or, rather, in the
desire to satisfy the greater needs of particularly vulnerable victims.
Our defense of the fair protection paradigm proceeds as follows :
Section A develops a fairness-based account of criminal law, which we call
"the fair protection paradigm." That Section espouses the view that
fairness in distribution of protection against crime entitles pa~ticularly
vuinerable individuals to a greater degree of protection. It also demonstrates
that the fair protection paradigm actually forms a theoretical basis for many
of the accepted practices of the criminal justice system. Section B
demonstrates that the fair protection paradigm is grounded in current
sentencing practices.
A. The Fair Protection Paradigm

The fair protection paradigm requires the state to distribute protection
in a fair manner to potential crime victims. The fair protection paradigm is

egalitarianism li es in supposing that it is morally important whether one person bas less than
another regardless of how much one of them has.").
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premised on the understanding that criminal law is a means of providing 3
good-protection against crime-and, therefore, that it is crucial to
guarantee that the good produced by criminal law be distributed fairly. This
Section demonstrates that fair protection is a compelling normative
principle that has important ramifications for understanding many of the
prevailing practices of criminal law. Yet the meaning of fairness is far from
settled. Theories of distributive justice differ radically in defining what:
constitutes a fair distribution of goods and, in particular, what a fair
distribution of protection from crime would entail.
Under one possible interpretation, fairness requires that the state not
discriminate between criminal offenders on the basis of the victims'
identities. 53 Equality, on this view, means treating all perpetrators of crimes
identically regardless of their victims' special needs and vulnerability to
crime. Thus, if the criminal law equally punishes crimes against African
Americans and crimes against whites, it respects the demands of equality in
two ways. First, it treats criminals equally by insisting that people who are
equally culpable and who have committed equally wrongful acts be equally
punished. Second, it protects victims equally because imposing differential
sanctions on criminals who have committed similar acts violates the rights
of different victims to be treated equally. Let us explore each of these
arguments.
Under the first argument, the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm
guarantees equality to the perpetrators of crime. Equality is guaranteed
under this view because meting out different punishments to equally
culpable perpetrators of equally wrongful criminal acts arguably
discriminates on irrelevant grounds and, consequently, violates the
requirement that the state treat criminal offenders fairly.
Yet this analysis is subject to serious objections. First, it fails to explain
prevailing sentencing practices. The possibility of rehabilitation is often
considered an important factor in sentencing. Yet, if one takes seriously the
argument that equally culpable perpetrators of equally wrongful crimes
should be subjected to identical sanctions, it is illegitimate to consider the
possibility of rehabilitation. Second, the argument presupposes what it
purports to prove. It is implicitly based on the premise that differential
sanctions are discriminatory unless they are grounded in differences in the
culpability of the perpetrator or the wrongfulness of the act. Yet it is
precisely this premise that the fair protection paradigm challenges. Under
the fair protection paradigm, differential sanctions do not discriminate
between equally situated criminals. Instead, they ref1ect the differential

53. This follows from the "parity requirement," namely, the requirement that individuals
who commit similar crimes should not be subjected to different punishments. See VON HIRSCH,
supra note 38, at 72-73.
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obligations on the part of the state to protect victims who differ in their
vulnerability to crime. Just as the greater obligation of the parent to protect
her child should not be perceived as discriminatory , so too the greater
obligation of the state to protect its more vulnerable members should not be
described as such. The wrongfulness-culpability paradigm cannot account
for these concerns because the concept of equality upon which it is
predicated is ill-equipped to capture the complexity of human interaction.
Under the second argument, the wrongfulness-culpability framework
protects victims equally. It distributes protection in a just manner because
meting out different punishments to offenders because of the identity of
their victims runs afoul of the idea of equality of victims. Punishing
identical criminal acts against different victims differently would convey
the message that certain citizens are more worthy than others, or at least
that crimes committed against certain victims are less condemnable and
therefore more "legitimate" than others. Thus, both the requirement to treat
victims equally and the requirement to treat perpetrators of crime equally
requires punishment in accordance with the wrongfulness-culpability
paradigm.
In order to rebut these arguments, imagine a society in which both
smoking and drinking are prohibited. The society is divided into a group of
smokers who inflict harm on the drinkers and a group of drinkers who
inflict harm on smokers. Assume further that there is much more illegal
drinking in public than illegal smoking and that, consequently, smokers are
much more exposed to illegal drinking than drinkers to illegal smoking. The
disparity in the amount of protection actually afforded to smokers suggests
that the system is unfair to the smokers, and one could persuasively argue
that the disparity in the protection granted to smokers and drinkers is a
cause for concern. Under a plausible interpretation of the fair protection
paradigm, the disparity between drinkers and smokers may provide a
sufficient reason for imposing harsher sanctions on illegal drinking than on
illegal smoking.
In order to implement the fair protection paradigm, one needs a way of
comparing the degree of protection granted to different potential victims.
For the purpose of this Essay, we use a simple measure based on the
concept of vulnerability . The vulnerability of a person to crime depends on
the expected costs of crime for this person. The greater an individual's
expected costs of crime, the more vulnerable she is. 54 The expected costs of
crime can be calculated by multiplying the probability of a crime by the
size of the harm caused by the crime.

54. For an attempt to explore the view that the expected costs of crime should be equalized
among different victims, see Hare!, supra note 8, at 1204-07.
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T his characteri zati o n of the co nce pt of vulne rabili ty is no t as sc ientifi c
as it In ay ~~CeH1 . The E1agnj tu de of ths harrn i~~: often a vag ue ccncept. rrhe
harm may involve a violation o f th e dignitary interests of the victim or the
violation of her autonomy , and any evaluation of the magnitude of those
harms is inevitably controversial. Moreover, the concept of probability of
harm is also less well-defined th an it may seem . S hou ld probability be
me asured with respect to aggregate e xposure to all type s of crime, or should
it be measured separately for every individual otlense ? What is the relevant
time frame for measuring it? Rather than provide a full-fledged measure for
vu lnerabi lity, our discussion presents a framework for such an enterpri se .
S uch a framework is sufficient because this Essay is concerned merely with
estab li shing the fundamental conto urs of the fair protection paradigm rather
than with its precise implementation.
Once one establishes the basic means of measuring the degree of
vulne rability to crime , it is necessary to desi g n a principle of distributive
justice to g uide the fair di stributi o n of protection among pote ntial victims of
crime. To this end , we will compare two co ntrasting views of the principle
governi ng the distribution of protection.
U nder one radically egalitarian view, fair distribution of protection
aga inst crime would require the state to equalize the expected costs of crime
for all potential victims . This view would imply a duty on the part of the
state to address any vulnerability to crime, regardl ess of its source, and to
place all its citizens on an equal footing in terms of their exposure to crime .
Fo r the reasons articulated earlier, however, such a radically egalitarian
view cannot be sustained.
We argued that vulnerability to crime is a function of myriad factors
such as wealth, age, attitude toward risk, life experience, and physical and
intellectual prowess. Some of these factors, such as the willingness of the
victim to take precautions against crime, do not justify intervention by the
state . The state cannot reasonably be expected to annul all the disparities in
the vulnerability of different potential crime victims.
T he implausibility of the radical egalitarian view does not, however,
necessitate a radically inegalitarian view, name ly, the view that the state
should be blind to differences in vulnerability to crime among victims . In
fact, the state's failure to redress some of the disparities in the expected
costs of crime among different potential victims is inherently unjust. Hence,
the only viable position is the intermediate view presented in this Essaythat the state should annul certain disparities in the vulnerability of different
victims while allowing other disparities to remain.
One of the primary tasks of a theory of criminal law , under the fair
protection paradigm, is to explain which factors influencing vulnerability to

57Q

The Yale Law .Journal

~u

[Vol. 109 : 507

d to . ~. e v~r~-t 1 taCHY;.-s
c .
..
' . .,
, sorne o! \VDJcn
ju:; [ify interference on the part of the state whil e others do not. Complying
under these circumstances with the dem ands of equality may often prove
very challenging. T o see why, it is useful to return to our fan ciful society of
drinkers and smokers .
Assume no\v th at both drinking and smoking are prohibited and th at
both prohibitions are enforced. However, the drinkers are less law-abiding
than the smokers. Thus, there is a lot more ill egal drinking th an ill egal
smoking. l'vloreover, smokers share an inclination to subject themselves
voluntarily to the ris ks of illegal drink:ing becau se they like to tease and
harass drinkers. T hus, they tend to congregate around drinkers, and,
consequently, they suffer fro m greater harms inflicted upon them by illegal
drinking. In thi s case, the disparate harm to smokers is attributable to two
factors: the beh <wior of the illegal drinkers and the smokers' inclination to
be around them.
It seems reaso nable that the disparity in vulnerability attributable to the
greater inclination of drinkers to violate the law should be annulled, while
the disparity attributable to the greater inclination of smokers to subject
themselves to the risks of illegal drinking should not be annulled by the
state. If this normative premise is adopted by the society, then the principle
of fair protection requites the legal system to make a special effort to
remedy the portion of the harm that stems from the illegal behavior of the
drinkers, but leave the portion of the harm that stems from the idiosyncratic
gr::~J. t er
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55. Under one possible view, the state has an obligation to annul those disparities not
attributable to the victim ' s own choices. Yet the conclusion that the state has no obligation to
annul any disparities attributable to a person's choi ces is false. If the greater vulnerability to crime
is attJibutab le to socially valuable activities, one may justifiably insist that those who perform
these activities be guaranteed a high degree of protection despite their vol untary decision to
expose the msel ves to crime. Thus , we insist on granting full protection to individuals who use
their First Amendment rights in a way that provokes a hostile reaction, even if by doing so th ey
voluntarily expose themse lves to severe risks. The so-called "Heckler's Veto" doctrine requires
that police use availab le resources to protect a speaker who inflames a hostile audience because of
the special importance of freed om of expression, despite the voluntary nature of the speech that
generates the risks. See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTfTUTJONAL LAW§ 12-10, at 853-55 (2d ed. 1988). Another exam ple can
be used w illustrate this point. Some owners of factories or stores decide, for ideological or
com merc ial reasons, to place th eir businesses in a depressed, high-crime area. Such commercial
activity is socially valuable because it provides economic opportunity to the disadvan taged.
Hence, it seems justified to devote more public resources to the protection of those businesses,
despite the voluntary exposure of those businesses to the ri sks of crime. Thus , the fact that
disparity in the vu lnerability of different victims is attributable to their own choices does not entail
that the state has no obligation to annul it. For a full discuss ion, see Hare!, supra note 8, at
1204-05.
Similarly, the fac t that disparity in the vulnerab ility of different victims cannot be attributed
to their own choices does not entail that the state has an obligation to annul it. Na'ivete may
increase o ne's vulnerability to cri me, yet it does not necessarily justify greater efforts on the part
of the state to annul th e disparity in the vulnerability of na'ive and sophisticated victims.
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prefere nces of the smokers unaddressed . To accomplish thi s, the soc iery
rn ust either assign the harm to the smokers in pro portion to its cau ses or
diminish the frequency of illegal drinking to the point at which it \Vo uld
have been if drinkers had been as law-abiding as smokers. One way to
accompli sh the latter is to increase the sanction on illegal drinking, in order
to redu ce the frequency of thi s behavior to the level at which it would have
been had drinkers been law-abiding citizens. It bears emphasizing that the
imposition of harsher sanctions in such cases is not intended to reflect the
greater wrongfulness of the act or the greater culpability of the actor, but
rather to equalize the distribution of protection by deterring offenders from
. .
.
.
.
. .
committing cnmes agamst certam VlCtims.
The primary challenge for the fair protection paradigm is to determine
which differences in the vulnerability of different victims are relevant to the
distribution of protection against crime and which are not. A
comprehensive treatment of this challenge is beyond the scope of this
Essay. Yet, once the principle of fair protection is accepted, and once it is
used to enhance the sanctions inflicted upon criminals who commit crimes
against vulnerable victims , it is intuitively plausible to argue that
vulnerability attributable to race, gender, or sexual orientation justifies
interference on the part of the state. A more complete defense of this view
will be articulated in Part III. The next Section demonstrates that the fair
protection paradigm has a powerful explanatory force. It illustrates that
some contemporary practices of criminal law can be explained only as
aimed at fair protection of potential victims of crime.
~

B. The Fair Protection Paradigm and Contemporary Sentencing Practices
Some sentencing practices embedded in the Sentencing Guidelines
should be interpreted as reflecting a concern for fair protection of potential
victims of crime. Section 3A 1.1 (b) of the Sentencing Guidelines states: "If
the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was
unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or that a
victim was otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct,
increase by 2 levels." 57 The provision's commentary offers some examples
to illustrate when the provision should be used . It states, for example, that
enhancement of the sanction would apply in a "fraud case where the

56. It should not be inferred from our discussion that we are committed to the view that the
disparity between drinkers and smokers should be redressed by the state. This example illustrates,
however, the potentially general applicability of the fair protection paradigm to issues less
controversial than bias crime.
57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MA NUAL§ 3Al.l(b) (1998).
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defendant marketed an ineffecti ve cure to cancer patie nts or m a robbery
where th e defenda nt targeted a handicapped victim.·· 58
The traditional interpretation of thi s pro vi sion maintai ns that it was
enacted to enhance the sanction of the more criminally depraved.59 Under
thi s interpretati on, this provision fits into the wrongfulness-c ulpability
paradigm , as it infli cts harsher sanction s on those who are more culpable.
Yet courts often use this provision to enhance th e sanctions of offenders
who attack vulnerable victims on the theory th at such victims are less able
to defend them selves .60 Thi s practice seems to comport better with the fair
protection paradigm.
Interestingly, courts often claim that the fact that a criminal chose a
victim who cannot defend herself indi cates a greater depravity on his
behalf. 6 1 Yet the premise that the willingness of the crimin al perpetrator to
exploit such a weakness makes him parti cularly culpable is not self-evident.
A willingness to cause a greater wrong to a victim indicates greater
depravity . But the harm intlicted by a cri me again st a vulnerable victim is
not necessarily greater th an the harm inflicted by a crime against a less
vulnerable victim. In fac t, in some cases the harm inflicted on vulnerable
(hi gh-risk) victims is less serious th an the harm inflicted on less vulnerable
(low-risk) victims. The inability to defend oneself increases one's
probability of becoming a crime victim. Yet such a person need not be a
particularly sensitive victim. Sometimes, the very factor that makes a
person a high-ri sk victim may also make her a low-sensitivity victim.62
One might, nevertheless, argue that crime directed at high-risk victims
is morally worse than crime directed at low-risk victims. Under this view,
which relies on the concept of fair play , it is simply particularly heinous to
prey on a high-risk victim because the victim does not have a fair
58. !d. § 3A 1.1 commentary , discussed in Jay Dyckman, Note , Brightening the Line:
Properly Identifying a Vulnerable Victim for Pt~~poses of Section JAJ .l of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines , 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1960, 1969-70 ( 1998).
59. See Dyckman , supra note 58 , at 1974-75 (citing case law in seven circuits).
60. See, e.g. , United States v. Shum way, 11 2 F.3d 14 13, 1423 (lOth Cir. 1997) (" [T]he
' vulne rable victim ' is someone who is unable to protect hi mself or herself from crimin al conduct,
and is therefore in need of greater societal protection than the average citizen. ").
6 1. See supra notes 59-60.
62 . Consider the following example. A group of youngs ters attacks a mentally disabled
individual. The aggression is meant primarily to humiliate the perso n rath er than to cause pai n.
The mentally challenged indi vidual is a hi gh- tisk victim because of his deficiency. Yet, because
of his limited mental ability, the person is not capable of comprehending the humiliatio n he goes
through, and consequently does not suffer th e same emotional trauma that another person would
suffer under these circ umstances.
Courts often apply the vulnerable victim enhance ment of section 3Al.l to victims who are
hi gh-risk but not hi ghly sensitive. Such a reading is advanced by several circuits. The Fifth Circuit
found that wo men desperate for romance were unusuall y vulnerable to a fraudulent scam that
targeted victims through personal advertisements. See United States v. Scu rlock, 52 F.3d 53 1,
541-42 (5th Cir. 1995). Simil arly , the Third Circuit upheld an enhance ment of a stockbroker who
used his relationship with his girlfriend to pressure her parents into inves ting in his fraudulent
scheme. See United States v. As torri , 923 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 199 1).
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opportuni ty to defe nd herse lf. This view is su pported by th e fact th at many
courts have stat:::d that section 3/\ 1.1 of th e Se nte ncing Guidelines is
parti cularly relevant to cases in which the victim cann ot defe nd herself. "3
But this view is prem ised on an analogy betwee n criminality and
sports manship-a dubi ous analogy, at best. 64 The ability or inability of the
victim to defend herself is perce ived as rele vant to sente ncing onl y bec ause
of the victim 's greater need fo r protection. It is not surpri sing , therefore,
that courts often slip from rhetoric that fits th e wro ngfuln ess-culpability
paradi gm to rhetori c th at better fits th e fair protec ti on paradi gm.65 From th e
va ntage point of th e fair protection paradigm , the pri mary justification for
e nhancing the punishment of criminals who assault vuln erable victim s is
the greater need for pro tection of thes e victims and the greater
responsibility of soci ety to inves t in protecting vi ctims who face greater
ri sks .
The enactment of sect io n 3A 1.1 raised numero us di sputes among courts
concerning the nature of th e vuln e rability th at justifies e nhancement of
criminal sanctions. Some co urts ha ve interpre ted the provision broadly,
while others have interpreted it nmTowly. Ad vocates of the narrow view
have stressed the need to limit the provision to cases in which the victim is
uniqu ely vulnerable. 66 Propone nts of the broad view, on the other hand ,
have argued that any vuln erability justifies use of secti on 3Al.l.
The fair protection paradi gm interprets the concept of vulnerability in
section 3A l.l in a way familiar to philosophers who write about
distributive justice. Some philosophers believe th at disparities among
63 . See, e.g., Uni ted States v. 0 ' Neil, 11 8 F. 3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 1997), cert . denied sub JZOm.
Saia v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 728 ( 1998) C In determin ing vul nerability, we focu s not on the
li kelihood or extent of harm to the individual if the crime is successful, but on the extent of the
individual' s ability to protect him se lf from the crime."); United States v. Gill, 99 F.3d 484, 486
(1 st Cir. 1996) (" [T]he vulne rable vi ctim guideline is prim arily concerned with the impaired
capac ity of the victim to detect o r preve nt th e crime."); United States v. Blake, 81 F.3d 498, 504
(4 th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defe ndant 's robbery attempts aimed at the elderl y, "who, by
virt ue of their age, were less ph ys icall y ab le to defend th emse lves ," satisfied section 3A 1. 1's
criteri a); United States v. Lalle mand, 989 F. 2d 936, 940 (7 th Cir. 1993) (holding th at "[a]
vulne rable or susceptible victim is (! ) less likely to defend himself, (2) less li kely perhaps to be
aware that he is a victim of c rime, (3) less li ke ly to complain" ); United States v. White, 903 F.2d
457,463 (7 th Cir. 1990) (upholding an e nh anceme nt for a defe ndant who kidn apped a 60-year-old
gas stati on attendant who had respiratory prob lems, and agreeing with the government's position
th at " [the defendant] would have had a far more difficult time and may have in fact been un able
to successfully kidnap a younger or healthier individual who might have been able to run and
successfully flee from the knife-wielding [defendant]"); see also RICHARD G. SINGER, JusT
DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQ UAUTY AND DESERT 86 (1 979) (" [C]riminals who
know ingly select victims who are incapable of defendin g the mselves are more morall y
blameworthy than others.").
64. This view is misguided, for it foc uses exclusivel y on the perpetrato r of the crime while
neg lecting the victim 's perspecti ve. A victim-oriented perspecti ve woul d reject, therefore, th e
atte mpt to ex plain the Sentencing G uidelines in terms of the wrongfulness or the culpability of the
perpe trator of th e crime.
65. See supra notes 59-60.
66. For a th orough discuss ion, see Dyckman, supra note 58.
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individuals can be justified when they can be attributed to their choices .67
Others believe that di sparities among individuals can be justified if they can
be attributed to their preferences, irrespective of whether they could have
chosen otherwi se. 68 One's view as to whether the state should annul the
di sparity in the vulnerability of different victims depends, therefore, on
one's convictions as to which kinds of dispariti es the state has an obligation
to annul.
Can the punishment of bias crimes be interpreted as a mechanism to
provide equal protection to potential victims? Do these statutes reduce
disparity in the protection of different victims?

III. BIAS CRIMES AND FAIR PROTECTION
This Part examines whether the fair protection paradigm can justify
bias crime legi slation . Section A provides arguments favoring such a
rationale. Section B addresses potential objections to this explanation.
A. Can the Fair Protection Paradigm Justify Bias Crime Legislation?

Bias crimes are crimes committed because of the race, color, religion,
or sexual orientation of the victim. Bias crime legislation enhances the
sanctions imposed on such crimes, relative to the sanctions imposed on
similar crimes not motivated by bias. By imposing harsher sanctions on bias
crimes, such legislation does not simply reduce the frequency of bias
crimes; it also reduces the exposure of the members of different groups to
bias crime in a differential manner. The neutral language employed in bias
crime statutes should not lead one to the erroneous conclusion that such
statutes have an identical effect on all groups. One should not confuse
neutral language with neutral impact. The greater the group's exposure to
bias crimes, the greater its benefit from bias crime legislation.
In fact, the neutral language of bias crime statutes is virtuous in an
important sense: It allows social reality to determine the practical effects of
bias crime legislation. More specifically, it ensures that the group most in
need of greater protection at any given time will actually receive it. For
example, if African Americans are attacked more frequently on racial
grounds , effective bias crime legislation will benefit African Americans
more than it does whites. If, in the future, a different group becomes more

67. See, e.g. , Richard J. Arneson , Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL.
On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 922
( 1989).
68. See, e.g. , Ronald Dworkin , What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, I 0 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 283,291-304 (1981).

STUD. 77 (1989); G.A. Cohen,
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vulnerable to crime, the ex isting scheme will automaticall y provide it with
more protection.
Moreover, the fair protection paradigm ex plain s so me of the more
salient features of bias crime legislation that cannot be explained by the
wrongfulness-culpability paradigm. Some bias crime statutes define bias
crimes as those committed because of the race, gender, re ligion, or sexual
orientat ion of the victim .69 However, not all bias crime statutes require
" racial" or " other" animu s toward the victims. As Frederick Lawrence
points out, bias crime statutes can be di vided into two models: a " racial
an imu s model " and a " discriminatory selection model." 70 The raci al
animu s model requires hostility toward the victim group as a constitutive
element of bias crime. The discriminatory selection model does not pose
any such requirement. All that is required under the discriminatory model is
that the race of the victim should somehow figure into the offender's
decision to act against her.
The discriminatory model of bias crime has proven to be especially
problematic for champions of the wrongfulness-culpability frame work . The
fo ll owing case suggested by Dillof illustrates the difficulty: "Mike is a
mugger who mugs blacks simply because he beli eves that the police are less
likely to vigorously investigate muggings of blacks. Mike feels no animus
toward blacks, but Mike' s belief concerning blacks has played a role in the
reasoning that led to his intention to assault blacks." 7 1
Dillof correctly points out that the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm
provides no reason to punish Mike more harshly in the case of hi s
apprehension. Admittedly, Mike selected his victims because of their race,
but he did so only to lower the probability of his anest. Mike's motive was
purely prudential; he did not act out of hostility or animosity toward his
victims, and thus no special culpability should attach to Mike.
Dill of's argument presents no difficulty whatsoever to the fair
protection paradigm. Taking the perspective of the victim, the fair
protection paradigm provides ample reason why offenders like Mike should
be subjected to a greater sanction. Mike, in the above hypothetical example,

69. See Dill of, supra note 3, at I 023.
70. LAWRENCE, supra note 3, at 29-39. Yet Lawrence him self admits that
[t]he landscape of state bias crime law thus consists of a few statutes falling clearly
within the discriminatory selec tion model or the racial animus model and a substantial
number of bias crime laws that are ambiguous as to what they punish. Several states
including Wisconsin have adop ted an explicit discriminatory se lection statute
governi ng bias crimes against a person, although virtually all state institutional
vanda lism laws are of thi s model. Several states have expli citl y adopted the racial
animus model. But the majo rity of states with bias crime Jaws are no t clear as to which
models they employ.
!d. at 38. For our purposes, it is important to note that the constitutionality of the discriminatory
selection model was affirmed by Wisconsin v. Mitchell , 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
71. Dillof, supra note 3, at I 076.
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sou ght to take advantage of the enh anced vu lnerability to crime of the black
population , whi ch resu lted from the reluctance of the police to in vestigate
crim es against them. This enhanced vulnerability of black s made the m
desirable targets to offenders like Mike as well as to other offenders who.
unlike M ike, may be motivated by raci al animus. T hus , enhanc ing the
sanct ion for offend ers who act again st bl acks was necessar; in thi s case to
equalize the vuln erability of blacks to crime. The greater deterren ce
provide d by the increased sanction compensates in this case, and in man y
others. for the initially hi gher vulnerab ility of blacks .
An even more troubling case for the adherents of the wro ngfulnessculpabi I ity paradi gm is that of the " Violent Show-Off. " 7 ~ Frederi ck
Lawrence describes the " Violent Show-Off' phenomeno n as follows:
The Violent Show-Off's purpose is to assault a victim in a manner
that will impress his friend s. To him, it is of no importance that the
manner itself calls for the discri minatory selection of a victim .
Although the racially di scriminatory dimension of the Viol ent
Show-Off's ac t is unconnected to the purpose of hi s conduct, he
does act with knowledge of his friends' prejudice. 73
Peer pressure and the desire to please others may indeed prompt attacks on
members of certain racial , religious, or gay groups , but champions of the
wrongfulness-culpability theory staunchly insist that such attacks should
not be considered bias crimes, since the offender lacked racial animus
toward the victim. As Fredrick Lawrence concludes, "[T]he Violent ShowOff still must meet the elements of a racial animus model statute. If he is
separated from the rac ial animus of his friends-if he had neither
knowledge of their animus nor reasonable basis to suspect it, then he ... is
not guilty of a bias crime." 74
Yet the fair protection paradigm recognizes that "Violent Show-Offs"
pose an additional risk to minorities' safety: the risk of being attacked by
people who do not necessarily hate minorities but who assault them
nevertheless to impress their friends. Thus, the possibility of being attacked
by a Violent Show-Off increases certain victims' need for protection. The
fair protection paradigm would grant such victims greater protection m
order to equalize their vulnerability to that of other potential victims.

72. The " Violent Show-Off' example ori ginated in a hypothetical proposed by th e Attorney
General of Wisconsin during th e oral argument to th e Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-l 0, Wisconsin v. Mitchell , 508 U.S. 476 (No. 92-515 ),
discussed in LAWRENCE, supra note 3, at 74.
73. L AWRENCE, supra note 3, at 75.
74. !d. at 78 .
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B. Objections ro th e Fair Protecrion Paradigm

The fair protection paradigm gives rise to several obj ection s. The most
powerful objection is that, although bias crime leg islati on promotes the
objecti ve of red ucing the disparity in the vulnerability of different victims,
that is not the prim ary inten tion of the legislation . ln order to present thi s
objectio n, let us examine carefull y the differences between section 3A 1.1 of
the Sentencing Gui del ines, which enhances the sanctions for those who
commit crimes again st vulnerabl e victims, and bias crime legisl ation.
There are two primary differences betwee n bias crime legislation ancl
legislation protectin g vu lnerable victims. First , bias crime legislation
requires that the vict im be selected because of her gender, race , religion, or
sex ual orientation,75 while section 3A 1.1 of the Sentencing G ui del ines
applies to any case in which the victim belongs to the vulnerable group. 76
Second , bias crime legislati on applies to crimes committed becau se of race,
ge nder, sexu al orientation, or religion , irrespective of whether the vi ct im
belongs to a more vulnerable group . Bias crime legislation enhances the
punishment of those who commit crimes against members of more
vulnerable groups as well as those who commit crimes against members of
less vulnerable groups. A racially motivated attack by an African American
o n a white person is no less a bias crime than a similarly moti vated at tack
by a white against an African American .
For these two reasons , it may be argued that bias crime legi slation
cannot effectively reduce inequality of protection. If the primary aim of bias
crime legislatio n had been to promote equality of protection against crime,
it would enhance only the sanctions of perpetrators of crime who attacked
vulnerable groups, irrespective of the motives underlying the attack.
Likewise, if the aim of bias crime legislation had been to reduce disparity in
the vulnerability of different victims, it would enhance punishment only for
those who directed their violence at members of a particularly vulnerable
group. Such legislation would be analogous to legislation that protects other
vulnerable groups, such as section 3A 1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. 77
However, an important difference between the goal of section 3A 1.1
and the goal of bias crime legislation may justify the different drafti ng
techniques. The vulnerability with which the Sentencing Guidelines deals
does not depend on cultural prejudices and beliefs. In contrast, bias crime is
rooted in cultural prejudices that change over time and space. Although race

75. On th e complexity o f the concept of causality, see JACOBS & POTIER, supra note I 0,
ch. 2.
76. In fact, some mi gh t suggest that crimes motivated by hatred toward the majority should
be exclud ed from the definition of hate crimes. Ye t such a view could possibl y vio late the
Fourtee nth Amendment' s Equal Protection Clause . See id. at 17.
77. See supra Section II.B.
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is a primary and persiste nt source of tension in our soc iety, the prim ary
victim s of racial hos tility may not always be id entifi ed in advance. A statute
enhancing the sanctions of perpetrators of crimes against any specific raci al
group may therefore fail to attain the goal of promoting equality of
protection. Such legislati on would be insensitive to the temporal and
geographical di versity of racial prejudices. The attempt to protect only
vulnerable groups is bound to fail in a di verse and dynamic society. Instead,
such a society needs to use legisl ation that is flexible e nough to
accommodate varying prejudices and consequently better equipped to
promote equality of protection in a changing environment.
Moreover, the centrality of motives to bias crime highlights the societal
concern for disparities in the vulnerability of victims that are attributable to
race or sexual orientation, but not disparities in the vulnerability of victi ms
that are attributable to other factors such as wealth inequality. Bias crime
legislation is intended to cancel out only certain disparities in the
vulnerability of different victims: those that are attributable to race,
religion, or sexual orientation. It is not intended to annul disparities in
vulnerability that are not attributable to these factors. Consequently, bias
crime legislation mu st employ motivation in order to address the disparities
that it intends to annul.
This explanation raises an additional problem . Arguably, our model
requires the state to prevent crimes that are attributable to race, religion, or
sexual orientation, but not those that are attributable to other factors such as
poverty.
This objection requires investigation. Identifying all the cases that
justify intervention on the part of the state is beyond the scope of this
Essay. But it must be acknowledged that there are limits to the degree to
which the legal system could provide equal protection against crime. All we
claim is that such intervention is justified when increased vulnerability
stems from a certain personal characteristic of the victim, such as race,
gender, religion or sexual orientation. While bias crime legislation reduces
the disparity in vulnerability to crime, it does not eliminate it altogether. It
is possible that bias c1ime legislation is insufficient and that further efforts
should be made to reduce other unjustifiable disparities in vulnerability to
cnme.
One can claim, of course, that differences in vulnerability to crime
resulting from wealth disparities should also be eliminated. We do not deny
this claim. Our Essay does not aim at exploring all the di sparities that may
justify state intervention. But even if one is convinced that the disparity in
vulnerability to crime that stems from wealth inequality should be
remedied, it is not necessarily the case that the best way to achieve this goal
is by enhancing the sanctions on crimes directed at the poor.
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There are two primary ways in which the state can remedy inequality in
the vulnerability of different victims. First, the state can remedy such
inequality by differentiating the sanctions imposed on the perpetrators of
crimes on the basis of the identity of their vict:irns. Pecpetrators who attack
more vulnerable victims could be subjected to harsher sanctions. Second ,
the state could vary its enforcement efforts in accordance with the identity
of the victim. [f this option is accepted , offende rs who attack more
vulnerable victims would face a higher probability of detection because of
the differential efforts of the law-enforcement authorities.
The choice between these two strategies depe nds on various factors. It
is relatively easy to remedy differential vulnerability attributable to wealth
inequality by increasing enforcement efforts. Increased police presence in
poor neighborhoods may constitute a more effective way to deter criminal
activity than enhanced sanctions on crimes directed at poor victims. It is
virtually impossible, however, to employ the same strategy when inequality
in vulnerability to crime is attributable to racial fac tors. It would be futile
on the part of the police to invest resources in detecting perpetrators of bias
crimes, because it is only after the perpetrator of the crime is detected that
one can discern her motives clearly. Thus, in the context of bias crime it is
easier and more efficient to use differential sanctions than differential
enforcement efforts to reduce disparity in victims' vulnerability.
Admittedly, these are tentative thoughts. Their purpose is not to show
that disparities in the vulnerability of different victims attributable to racial
factors should be reduced by differentiating sanctions, while disparities in
the vulnerabilities of different victims attributable to wealth inequality
should be reduced by differentiating enforcement efforts. The only purpose
of these reflections is to show that disparities in the vulnerabilities of
different victims may be remedied in different ways. Certain disparities
may be remedied more effectively by differentiating criminal sanctions,
while others may be addressed more efficiently by differentiating
enforcement efforts.
Finally, we would like to address two objections that challenge not the
fair protection paradigm itself or its application to bias crimes, but rather
the way in which such a concern should be imported into the legal system.
Arguably, enhanced sentencing for bias crimes should be implemented
through the Sentencing Guidelines rather than through the criminal law. In
Section II.B, we discussed the provisions enhancing the sanctions imposed
for crimes directed against victims who are particular! y susceptible to
criminal conduct. Those provisions were interpreted as another example
demonstrating the concern of the legal system to provide equal protection.
Yet those provisions are part of the Sentencing Guidelines rather than the
criminal law. Why is it that, in the case of bias crimes, the enhancement of
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sanct ions is achieved through special provisions of the criminal LPN rather
tha n through the pro visions of the Sentencing Guidelines'/
In order to address thi s question fully, one wo uld need to develop a
theory of the conceptual difference between enhanc ement of sanctions
th rough the criminal law and enhancement of sanctions through the
sentencing guidelines. It is beyond the scope of this Essay to provide such a
theory. Yet one justificatio n for the cunent practice is to highlight the
commitment of the legal system to equal protecti o n. Crimina l law is a much
more pol itically visible scheme of regulation. Enhancing sanctions throu gh
the crimina l law, therefore, guarantees greater visibility of equal protection
concerns .78
F inally, one might arg ue that the disparity in the vulnerability of
potential victims attributab le directly to racial hatred is not important
enough to justify state interv ention. After all, bi as crimes constitute only a
tiny fract ion of the criminal activity in the Uni ted States. Blacks are clearly
more vu lnerable to crime than whites, bu t their greater vulnerability cannot
be attributed only to bias crimes. The effect of bias crimes o n the
vul nera bility of blacks is small relative to the effect that the disparity in
wealth has on their vulnerability to crime.
W hile it is probably true that poverty affects vulnerability to crime
more than any racial or other fac tor, this does not suggest that other sources
of vulnerability should be overlooked, or even left untouched, until the
problem of wealth inequality is addressed. The liberal state has a special
commitment to reducing vulnerable victims' exposure to crime , and bias
crime legislation may be a good way of achiev ing eq uality. The special
o bligation of the state to provide protection is governed by principles of
equality. Bias crime legislation is simply an expression of the greater duty
of the state to protect its vulnerable members.
CONCLUSION

By presenting and exploring the contours of the fair protection
paradigm, this Essay seeks to accomplish two goals. First, it attempts to
provide a sorely lacking theoretical justification for bias crime legislation.
Second, it tries to demonstrate that bias crime legislation is congruous with
other contemporary practices of the criminal law . T hi s Essay argues,
contrary to prevailing theories, that the wrongfulness of the criminal act and
the culpability of the criminal perpetrator are not necessarily the only two
fa ctors that should determine the content of criminal prohibitions and the

78. This argument sugges ts th at perhaps the pro visions protecting victims who are
partic ularl y susceptible to crim inal condu ct should be part of th e crimin al law rather than the
Sentenc ing Guidel ines .
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sanctio ns imposed for their violatio n. To substantiate thi s clai m, thi s Essay
establishes an important connection betwee n criminal law and theories of
distributive justice. Perceiving th e criminal law as a system for distributing
protec ti o n against crime has important descriptive an d presc rip tive
ramificatio ns. Descriptively, it helps explain certain salie nt features of th e
criminal justice system. Prescriptively , it allows consideration of important
societal concerns in determ ining the content o f the norms of the criminal
law. Furthermore, it makes a demand upon the state to equali ze the
protectio n the state provides to potential crime victims and to co nsider
diffe re nces between indi viduals in determining law e nforce me nt and
sentencing policies. To be sure, the fair protection paradigm needs to be
furth er deve loped , and its contours require more preci se delineation . The
introduction of thi s principle in this Essay and its applicatio n to bias crimes
constitute a first step in this direction .

